Populist Movements and Reactions to Them: Brexit, Trump, Bolsonaro, and Covid-19

News

Oct 24

Written By Lily Markle

A review of the literature

by John Morrison

October 24, 2024

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Academic Definitions of Populism

Cas Mudde, a Dutch political scientist, published The Populist Zeitgeist in 2004, which argued that populism is a “thin” ideology made up of a few core beliefs. His work would become the backbone of academic populism studies.

Peter C Baker writes for the Guardian that “In 2004 a young Dutch political scientist named Cas Mudde published The Populist Zeitgeist, a paper that proposed a new and concise definition of populism – one that would become the backbone of academic populism studies, a field that hardly existed at the time.”

“Mudde was convinced that populism was a useful concept, which meant something more specific than ‘democracy, but practiced in a way that I find distasteful.’”

“He was especially keen to challenge two common intuitions about populism:”

“That it is uniquely defined by ‘highly emotional and simplistic’ rhetoric.”
“That it primarily consists of ‘opportunistic policies’ that aim to ‘buy’ the support of voters.”

“Populism, Mudde argued, is more than just demagogy or opportunism. But it is not a fully formed political ideology like socialism or liberalism – it is instead a “thin” ideology, made up of just a few core beliefs.”

“First: the most important division in society is an antagonistic one between “the people”, understood to be fundamentally good, and “the elite”, understood to be fundamentally corrupt and out of touch with everyday life.”
“Second: all populists believe that politics should be an expression of the “general will” – a set of desires presumed to be shared as common sense by all “ordinary people”. (Implicit in this belief is another: that such a thing as this “general will” exists.)

Mudde’s definition explained the problem at the heart of populism - How can opposing politicians like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders be defined under the same ideological umbrella? Because populism is when politicians piggyback on a more substantial host ideology that unifies the will of the people.

Baker continues, “For decades, attempts at clear-headed conversations about populism had been stymied by the question of how it could be attributed to parties and politicians that were so obviously different: how can Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, for example, both be called populist? In what way are Occupy Wall Street and Brexit both possible examples of populist phenomena?”

“Mudde’s simple definition caught on because it has no trouble answering this type of question.”

“If populism is truly ideologically ‘thin,’ then it has to attach itself to a more substantial host ideology in order to survive.”
“But this ideology can lie anywhere along the left-right spectrum. Because, in Mudde’s definition, populism is always piggybacking on other ideologies, the wide variety of populisms isn’t a problem. It’s exactly what you would expect.”

“A populist movement, then, is one that consistently promises to channel the unified will of the people, and by doing so undercut the self-serving schemes of the elite establishment.”

“As the National Front founder Jean-Marie Le Pen put it in 2007: “I will give voice to the people. Because in democracy only the people can be right, and none can be right against them.” (Note how, in this formulation, there is no disagreement among ‘the people’.)”
“Or, in the more recent words of Donald Trump, speaking at his inauguration: “We are transferring power from Washington DC and giving it back to you, the people … The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.” (Note how members of “the establishment” are implicitly excluded from “the citizens”.)”

“The people” and “the elite”, Mudde wrote, are groupings with no static definition from one populist movement to another. These categories are, first and foremost, moral: people good, elites bad. What matters above all is the blame of a perceived class of corrupt elites.

Bush writes in his Guardian article on populism that “The question of exactly who belongs in which group, though, depends on the character of the populist movement, and which ‘thick’ ideology the populism ends up attached to.”

“A populist ‘people’ can define itself by an ethnic identity it feels is under threat, but just as easily by a shared sense of being victims of economic exploitation.”

“What matters is that it blames a perceived class of corrupt elites; in the case of rightwing populisms, it may also heap scorn on some underclass, whether immigrants or racial minorities, whom the elites are accused of favoring with special treatment as part of their plot to keep power away from ‘real people.’”

The thin-ideology definition is also extremely congenial to the landscape of contemporary academic political science, which places a considerable premium on broad frameworks that enable young scholars to do empirical, quantitative work.

Baker adds that “Many new scholars of populism no longer feel the need to argue over definitions. Instead, they perform textual analyses designed to detect how often populism’s core ideas, as laid out in Mudde’s 2004 article, pop up in party platforms, political speeches, manifestos, and tweets.”

“Or they administer surveys designed to track the prevalence of the core tenets of populism in different populations, searching for profiles of archetypal populist voters.”

“Every time another paper relying on the ideological framework is published, it becomes a little more entrenched – a matter of some frustration to the minority of academics who still think it misses the point.”

The Broad Spectrum of Populism

In response to the panic, some commentators question whether populism even exists. Just as there were no real witches in Salem, there are no real populists in politics – just people, attitudes, and movements that the political center misunderstands and fears, and wants you, the reader, to fear too, although without the burden of having to explain exactly why.

Peter C Baker writes for the Guardian that “Populism, in this framing, is a bogeyman: a nonentity invoked for the purpose of stirring up fear. This argument has even made its way to the centrist mainstream.”

New York Times columnist Roger Cohen wrote in July 2018, “Let’s do away with the word ‘populist.’ It’s become sloppy to the point of meaninglessness, an overused epithet for multiple manifestations of political anger.”

“Worse, it’s freighted with contempt, applied to all voters who have decided that mainstream political parties have done nothing for their static incomes or disappearing jobs or sense of national decline these past two decades. “Populism” is a dismissive term for everything metropolitan elites can’t quite find the energy to understand.”
“Resort to the populist label is synonymous with dismissal. It reflects the superior view that the deluded plebes — seldom encountered in person — have got it wrong. It flirts with disrespect of democracy. Sometimes it reflects a grudging acknowledgment that these days populism equals political effectiveness — so we, the liberal victims of its power, need to find our own “populist” message.”

Some examples Cohen listed include:

“Donald Trump’s movement is ‘populist.’”
“The supporters of Britain’s exit from the European Union are ‘populists.’”
“The two very different parties in a coalition governing Italy are ‘populist.’”
“The Economist refers to a ‘populist virus.’”
“The Atlantic, to ‘demagogic populists.’”
“The Washington Post, to ‘populism sweeping the Middle East.’”
“The New York Times, to a ‘Kurdish populist movement’ and a Thai ‘populist movement.’”
“The BBC, to the Catalan national movement as ‘far less about separatism than populism.’”

The problem is that the term “populist” has become a catchall so broad that the only common thread it contains is the distaste for it felt by its facile users. Populism is often used by liberals in a contemptuous and dismissive manner.

Roger Cohen wrote for the New York Times “that populists may be authoritarians, ethnonationalists, nativists, leftists, rightists, xenophobes, proto-fascists, Fascists, autocrats, losers from globalization, moneyed provocateurs, conservatives, socialists, and just plain unhappy or frustrated or bored people — anyone, from the crazed to the rational, from the racist to the tolerant, energized by social media to declare the liberal democratic rules-based consensus that has broadly prevailed since the end of the Cold War is not for them for the simple reason that it has not delivered for them, whether economically or socially or culturally.”

Jan-Werner Muller, professor of politics at Princeton University, has written in The Guardian, “The profile of supporters of populism obviously matters, but it is patronizing to reduce all they think and say to resentment, and explain the entire phenomenon as an inarticulate political expression of the Trumpenproletariat and its European equivalents.”

For Cohen, the key word here is “patronizing.” Liberal contempt is rampant. I also think Muller’s supporters of “populism” are in reality supporters of something more precise that must be identified.

Explanations For Populism

Michael Shellenberger states that ruling parties are clamping down on populism because governments have become historically unpopular in the face of populist policies. The way to reduce their appeal is to reduce their online presence.

Shellenberger asks, “Why are they doing it? Because ruling parties across Europe are unpopular and face a historic beating at the hands of political parties opposed to the war in Ukraine and mass immigration.”

“These establishment politicians plainly fear the rise of populist right-wing parties, which have surged in the face of a migrant crisis in Europe, just as Trump’s support in the US has grown for similar reasons.”

“And they appear to be seeking to reduce their appeal by reducing their presence online.”

Peter C Baker, writing in the Guardian in 2019, blamed populism on the “failure of Western governments to enact a credible vision of shared prosperity and security in the post-manufacturing era”. He added that the problem is exacerbated by ideologies and political parties falling apart.

Baker says “Thanks in large part to the persistent failure of governments across the West to enact anything resembling a credible vision of shared prosperity and security in the post-manufacturing era, we are now living through a time when familiar webs connecting citizens, ideologies, and political parties are, if not falling apart, at least beginning to loosen and shift.”

“As a result, the question of populism is not going away. The coming years are likely to include all of the following:”

“More movements being labelled as populist.”
“More movements calling themselves populist.”
“More movements defensively insisting that they are not populist.”
“And more conversations about the extent to which populism represents the problem or the solution.”

The Four Counter-Populist Framings

There appears to be a limited number of interpretive frameworks used by the US government, NATO, and their allies for characterizing their populist enemies: 1. Foreign 2. Crazy 3. Harmful and 4. Undemocratic.

Michael Shellenberger writes for Public that “From the Russia hoax to the Covid lab leak to the recent riots in Ireland, the news media, governments, and leading NGOs have framed populists as foreign, crazy, harmful, and undemocratic.”

“This limited number of ‘frames’ displays, Shellenberger believes, a level of message discipline that is uncharacteristic of genuinely grassroots political movements.”

“Having worked on various activist political causes for 35 years, one defining characteristic is their lack of message discipline. Activists and NGOs struggle to work together in coalitions because they all want to emphasize different messages.”

Shellenberger continues, “That’s not the case in these counter-populist movements. Across seven years, every major counter-populism effort used one of those four interpretative frames when they could have drawn on many alternatives, including framing populism as economically inefficient, which was the dominant counter-populist frame before 2016.”

“It’s notable that the four core attacks, foreign, crazy, harmful, and undemocratic are all emotive and distinctive and appeal to both liberal and conservative values and concerns.”

It doesn’t matter if the counter-populist narrative is untrue, like the claims that Trump was a Russian agent. Simply debating something is enough for many people to believe there is some truth in it, which is why mass media is so effective at smearing populist movements.

According to UC Berkeley linguist George Lakoff, “Framing is about getting language that fits your worldview. It is not just language. The ideas are primary, and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas.”

Michael Shellenberger writes that “Framing is thus about the broader envelope of meaning, even when the meaning of something is negated, or debunked.” Lakoff explains:

“When I teach the study of framing at Berkeley, in Cognitive Science 101, the first thing I do is I give my students an exercise. The exercise is: Don’t think of an elephant! Whatever you do, do not think of an elephant. I’ve never found a student who is able to do this. Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge: Elephants are large, have floppy ears and a trunk, are associated with circuses, and so on. The word is defined relative to that frame. When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame.”

Shellenberger continues that “Many Trump supporters, for example, wonder why so many people still believe Trump was a Russian agent, despite the findings of the Mueller report.”

“Lakoff offers an answer: because the country spent years debating whether or not Trump was a Russian asset.”
“Simply debating something is enough for many people to believe there is some truth in it. This is the reason politicians are constantly trying to change the subject.”

Shellenberger notes, “This is especially true in a mass media society where the impossibly large quantity of information requires people to use shortcuts, particularly relying on particular media, such as MSNBC or Fox News, for their interpretation of events.”

One word for what US government contractors were trying to do with their counter-populism was “menticide,” which is the systematic destruction of an individual’s ability to think for themselves and hold their own values or beliefs.

Alex Gutentag writes for Public News that “It is a process enacted on prisoners of war, and which was described by the Dutch psychoanalyst Joost Merloo in his 1956 book, The Rape of the Mind.”

“In his analysis of brainwashing techniques in totalitarian regimes, Meerloo wrote,”

“The continual intrusion into our minds of the hammering noises of arguments and propaganda can lead to two kinds of reactions.

Merloo notes that “It may lead to apathy and indifference, the I-don't-care reaction, or to a more intensified desire to study and to understand.”

“Unfortunately, the first reaction is the more popular one. The flight from study and awareness is much too common in a world that throws too many confusing pictures to the individual.”

Perhaps the most profound of all four of the counter-populist framings is “foreign.” It is deeply primitive, tapping into “in group/out group” instincts and if populism owes its power to foreign influence then it loses its power.

Michael Shellenberger writes that “The power of populism arises from its claim to be authentically of the people. If it can be shown that the ‘populism’ is not genuine because it owes its power to a foreign influence, it loses its power.”

“The Establishment used it successfully during the Cold War to disparage and raise suspicions about people on the Left, from socialists in Hollywood to Cold War scientists to Civil Rights activists.”

Shellenberger continues that “It is easy to see why foreignness rose to the top in importance for framing not only Trump’s victory but also Hunter Biden’s laptop and anti-Ukraine war activists.”

“It seems inevitable, in retrospect, that counter-populist military and intelligence leaders would recognize the power of the ‘foreign’ frame and exaggerate Russia’s influence in the 2016 election.”
“Wholly concoct a Russia connection to Alabama populist Republican Senate candidate Roy Moore in 2017.”
“And fabricate Russian influence on Twitter through the ‘Hamilton 68’ project in 2018, which falsely claimed widespread Russian bot and troll influence in Trump’s MAGA movement.”

The most frequently used counter-populist frame is “conspiracy theory.” To accuse someone of being a conspiracy theorist is to effectively call them crazy, delusional, and irrational.

Michael Shellenberger writes that “US security state representatives used the word with rising frequency in response to the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963. Today they attach the label to a wide range of issues, as the list above shows.”

“While such a person’s motivations may not be as bad as somebody who has effectively betrayed America for a foreign nation, the labeling of someone a conspiracy theorist is a way of saying they cannot be trusted.”

Shellenberger continues that “In some cases, ‘hate’ and ‘fascist’ are the same counter-populist frames, but they are also clearly differentiated, as recent events show.”

“Counterpopulists frame Trump and his supporters as fascists and haters but just months earlier had framed Brexiteers and Irish rioters as driven by hatred.”
“Fascism requires a level of discipline and organization belied by rioting. Or it requires a menace to its neighbors, which is belied by Brexit’s withdrawal of Britain from them.”

There is evidence that the efficacy of the four framings above is waning and may explain why there has of late been greater emphasis by advocates of censorship on “hate speech” and proto-fascism among populist leaders.

Michael Shellenberger writes for Public News that, “The high point of the Russia framing was surely April 2019, when Robert Mueller released his report finding insufficient evidence of collusion with Russia to charge Trump.”

He continues, “the assumption that ‘conspiracy theories’ are always wrong is undermined by the majority of the American people believing that:”

“Covid came from a lab.”
“President Joe Biden was involved in his son’s influence-peddling.”
“The US government is hiding information about UFOs.”

Shellenberger notes that “The loss of credibility behind the Russia and conspiracy theory framings may explain why there has of late been greater emphasis by advocates of censorship on ‘hate speech’ and proto-fascism among populist leaders.”

“The Irish government is demanding sweeping new powers to censor its citizens, and perhaps others around the world, for hate speech online.”
“The Washington Post, New York Times, and every other major publication has recently begun a new cycle of stories claiming that Trump will end democracy as we know it if elected next year.”

The counter-populists aim is to legitimize their rule as rational, scientific, protective, and democratic. But their false framings have only accelerated the lack of trust in establishment figures.

Michael Shellenberger writes, “It is also notable that, once analyzed, we can see what the global establishment is trying to do with its counter-populist framings. It aims to legitimize its rule as rational, scientific, protective, and democratic.”

“But it’s not working. The public’s trust in globalization and the establishment have only declined during the last seven years.”

“While that has mostly been on the Right, even the Left (Democrats) say their trust in the news media and universities has declined.”

Shellenberger notes that “By being increasingly limited to labeling populists hateful and fascist, counter-populists risk becoming shrill and illegitimate.”

“There has been a cycle of stories in the news media over the last few weeks calling populist candidates ‘hard right,’ as though that label will move people who weren’t moved by the label ‘far right’ just two years ago.”
“It is reminiscent of apparently aborted efforts by the Biden administration to label Trump supporters ‘ultra-MAGA,’ apparently out of the belief that the word ‘ultra’ would move voters.”

Why Governments Fail, According to Martin Gurri

Late modernist governments have asserted their claims of competence from the same peak of ambition that launched the high modernist projects. This has placed them in a false and dangerous position. It is too late in the day now for such romance: the government has lost the will for heroic effort.

Martin Gurri writes in Chapter 7 of Revolt of the Public that “When Barack Obama entered into office, he stood in the shadow of his predecessors. He looked back with envy and nostalgia to FDR, LBJ, even Ronald Reagan.”

“Like all his contemporaries, President Obama imitated the high modernist habit of defining specific conditions as immense problems which demanded equally large solutions.”
“In the recession of 2009, he found the need to make ‘a clean break from a troubled past, and set a new course for our nation.’”
“President Bush had done much the same after the atrocities of 9/11. Instead of focusing on the group that perpetrated the attack, he declared a global “war on terror.”

Gurri continues that “Late modernist governments have asserted their claims of competence from the same peak of ambition which launched the high modernist projects. This has placed them in a false and dangerous position.”

“High modernism failed, but it involved governments in actions of monumental proportions, which dazzled elites and public alike by the scope of their objectives.”
“The story told about these projects wasn’t one of failure but of epic activity, high drama, reaching for the stars.”

Most things fail because our species tends to think in terms of narrowly defined problems and usually pays little attention to the most important feature of these problems: the wider context in which they are embedded. Increasing the size of the state does not decrease unemployment or improve the economy, but this blind attitude in part explains growing resentment at the state’s failures.

Martin Gurri writes in Revolt of the Public that “In Why Most Things Fail, Ormerod’s abiding interest was to understand human action in the framework of complex systems.”

“An action can be an individual decision or a government program.”
“A complex system can be a company or a nation.”

Gurri continues that “For analytical purposes, it’s all the same. The heart of the matter, for Ormerod, was how closely an actor’s intention matched up with the results of his action.”

Gurri says, “His title gives the answer away. Ormerod has found no obvious connection between the results of actions in a complex environment and their stated intentions.”

“That holds true for you and me, for corporations like Apple and Google, and for the Federal government.”
“Most things fail, because our species tends to think in terms of narrowly defined problems, and usually pays little attention to the most important feature of these problems: the wider context in which they are embedded.”
“When we think we are solving the problem, we are in fact disrupting the context. Most consequences will then be unintended.”

Gurri notes that “Ormerod examined the performance of democratic governments on those issues that perennially engaged their ambitions: what I have called their claims to competence. Take unemployment as an obvious example.”

“Every contemporary government has claimed the ability to reduce unemployment.”
“The architects of the stimulus bill passed in 2009 claimed that it would save or create 3.5 million jobs and significantly lower the unemployment rate.”
“It would do so by spending a lot of money. Of necessity, that has been the chosen economic tool of government.”

Gurri writes that “Since World War II, Ormerod notes, governments have absorbed a much larger chunk of the national output in pursuit of worthy goals such as full employment.”

“In Britain, where excellent statistics have been kept from the Victorian era onward, the size of the public sector as a proportion of the economy has doubled since 1946, compared to the period 1870–1938.”
“Yet the difference in the average unemployment rate before and after the expansion of government was statistically negligible.”

He writes that “A similar historical trajectory described every wealthy democratic country, including the US.”

“The public sector grew enormously, while long-term unemployment rates remained unaffected.”
“The stimulus cost nearly $800 billion, but its effect on unemployment, if any, was still a subject of debate.”

“Whatever benefits may have arisen from this massive increase in the role of the state, reducing unemployment, the primary cause of poverty, has not been one of them,” Ormerod concluded.”

Politicians should be rewarded for the modesty of their claims about the economy rather than the heroic ambition of their rhetoric.

Gurri says, in Chapter 9, the first problem “has to do with honesty in our expectations. Presidents can’t handle the economy.”

“They have no clue how to do it. The experts who advise them rarely have what N. N. Taleb has called ‘skin in the game’: they pay no penalty when they are wrong, as they were, catastrophically, in 2008, and immediately again, with the stimulus, in 2009.”

“When it comes to economic questions, politicians should be rewarded for the modesty of their claims rather than the heroic ambition of their rhetoric.”

“Sitting presidents should be applauded for discarding the pose of papal infallibility, and speaking about uncertainty, risk, and trade-offs.”
“The more people we elect to office who grasp the concept of trial and error, which means nothing more than learning from mistakes, the happier we should be.”

Failure has bred frustration, frustration has justified negation, and negation has paved the way for the nihilist, who acts, quite sincerely, on the principle that destruction of the system is a step forward, regardless of alternatives. We know what this looks like, Al Qaeda as the nihilist wing of Islamism, or Anders Breivik.

In Chapter 10 of Revolt of the Public, Martin Gurri writes of “Anders Breivik, Norwegian, affluent and well-educated by global standards, (who) posted a 1,518-page manifesto online abominating the system that had pampered him, then detonated a bomb near the prime minister’s office in Oslo and personally shot dozens of young kids to death.”

“Consider him a premonition. The longer the collision between public and authority grinds on unresolved, the more likely we are to endure a multiplication of Breiviks.”
“And we already know what that looks like. Al Qaeda, the nihilist wing of political Islam, has shown the way.”

The nihilist is dangerous in part because he’s right. The elites wrongly believed they could ordain the future.

Martin Gurri writes in Chapter 9 that “Zapatero was egregiously mistaken when he imagined that the Spain of 2008 was not in the grip of an economic crisis.”

“President Bush was equally mistaken about Iraq, President Obama about the stimulus.”

He notes that “these were very unlike political personalities, espousing very different ideologies, but they were similar in one crucial respect: they believed they could ordain the future.”

“They embodied a system that had lost touch with reality. If democracy is to be judged on their performance, it would be hard not to lapse into negation.”

Martin Gurri and The Coming War Between Hierarchy and Network (or center and border)

The repudiation of history—in effect, of our present reality and hence of ourselves—is among the most powerful motives propelling the revolt of the public. It’s the shortest route to nihilism and the logical justification for the death cult.

Martin Gurri says, in the afterword of Revolt of the Public, that “Although followers of ISIS speak in an opaque theological jargon, there’s nothing peculiarly Muslim or religious about yearning to escape the coils of history (and a significant minority was of non-Muslim origin). We have stumbled across this theme before.”

“Catalans imagine that the past has robbed them of nationhood.”
“Vladimir Putin dreams of rescuing Russia out of the dead carcass of the Soviet Union.”
“Donald Trump has condemned our ‘American carnage.’”
“The right-wing populist government of Poland has made it illegal to bring up the subject of Polish collaboration with Nazi war crimes.”
“The left-leaning city fathers of Seattle, Washington, have transmuted Columbus Day into ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Day.’”

Gurri adds, “The repudiation of history—in effect, of our present reality and hence of ourselves—is among the most powerful motives propelling the revolt of the public.”

“It’s the shortest route to nihilism and the logical justification for the death cult. In the turgid manifesto of one prolific lone killer, the word “history” recurs 510 times, like a ritual curse.”

The people at the top must raise the public’s understanding to a higher plane. In the attempt, however, they will collide head-on with the social imperatives of the system they represent. But as elite fear and loathing of the public has increased, so has the craving for distance and isolation.

Martin Gurri writes that “The industrial model of liberal democracy isn’t particularly democratic in structure. It’s a steep hierarchy that operates in broadcast mode only.”

“The distance between top and bottom is very great. The chasm of distrust will be difficult to bridge.”
“And as elite fear and loathing of the public has increased, so has the craving for distance and isolation.”
“Elites today have no idea how to speak to the public or what to say to it. They have shown little interest in trying.”

Gurri notes that “The hyper-educated individuals who ran the Clinton campaign were utterly indifferent to public opinion: they believed in big data.”

“An algorithm nicknamed ‘Ada’ delivered ‘simulations’ of opinion to the campaign staff.”
“Ada was the public as elites wish it would be: safe, clean, and speaking only when spoken to.”
“The voter in the flesh was clearly perceived by this group as an alien and frightening brute. His very existence was deplorable. The shock of Election Day followed naturally from such distortions of distance.”

Gurri adds, “The men flushed out by the sexual scandals of the past year measured their success in terms of distance.”

“They leveraged their exceptional talents to transcend the rules by which ordinary people are judged. Great institutions protected and indulged them.”
“Physical contact with the public was ritualized to advantage. Other elites flattered them constantly.”
“You became, in your own eyes, a superb humanitarian. You were a role model to those beneath you. You could be a rapist but also a moral compass to the nation.”

Anti-establishment figures face a dilemma when they take power: continue to smash away at institutions and wreck everything, or compromise with elites and demolish their credibility. Few have found a way out of this labyrinth, and this dilemma explains the Trump presidency’s instability.

Martin Gurri writes that “Politicians swept into office by the anti-establishment flood face an immediate dilemma. Once in government, they can continue to smash away at the institutions—but this will damage the economy and consequently their popularity.”

“Alternatively, they can move to the mainstream and compromise with the elites—but this will demolish their credibility and alienate their base of support. Few have found a way out of the labyrinth.”

Gurri notes that “Alexis Tsipras tried each approach in turn, and failed at both. The bizarre schizoid style of the Trump administration becomes intelligible as an attempt to escape this dilemma.”

“Elected as an agent of negation, President Trump must now promote positive policies and programs.”
“Any direction he takes will alienate some of his supporters, who are bound together largely on the strength of their repudiations. A predilection for the mainstream will alienate most of them.”

Hierarchy has ruled the world since the human race attained meaningful numbers, but a war between the worlds is coming, between hierarchy and network, between center and border. Institutions and landmarks of the old regime, like newspapers and political parties, will disintegrate under the pressure.

Gurri says in Chapter 3, “My thesis is a simple one. We are caught between an old world which is decreasingly able to sustain us intellectually and spiritually, maybe even materially, and a new world that has not yet been born.”

“Given the character of the forces of change, we may be stuck for decades in this ungainly posture. You who are young today may not live to see its resolution.”

He writes that “Famous landmarks of the old regime, like the daily newspaper and the political party, have begun to disintegrate under the pressure of this slow-motion collision. Many features we prized about the old world are also threatened: for example, liberal democracy and economic stability.”

“Some of them will emerge permanently distorted by the stress.”
“Others will just disappear.”
“Many attributes of the new dispensation, like a vastly larger sphere for public discussion, may also warp or break from the immovable resistance of the established order.”

Each side in the struggle has a standard-bearer: authority for the old industrial scheme that has dominated globally for a century and a half, the public for the uncertain dispensation striving to become manifest. The two sides have little in common and clash over everything.

Martin Gurri says, “In this war of the worlds, my concern is that we not end up with the worst of all possible worlds. The two protagonists share little in common, other than humanity—and each probably doubts the humanity of the other.”

“They have arrayed themselves in contrary modes of organization which require mutually hostile ideals of right behavior.”
“The conflict is so asymmetrical that it seems impossible for the two sides actually to engage. But they do engage, and the battlefield is everywhere.”

The perturbing agent between authority and the public is information. It has exhibited predictable patterns of top-down behavior, but with the internet, the public can now connect to one another.

Gurri says that “For my description of the present to make sense, I will have to show how such a vague, abstract concept can be wielded as a weapon in the war of the worlds.”

“From the era of Rameses to that of Hosni Mubarak, it has exhibited predictable patterns of behavior:”

“Top-down, centralizing, painfully deliberate in action, process-obsessed, mesmerized by grand strategies and five-year plans, respectful of rank and order but contemptuous of the outsider, the amateur.”

“Against this citadel of the status quo, the Fifth Wave has raised the network:”

“That is, the public in revolt, those despised amateurs are now connected to one another by means of digital devices.”

But digital networks are not hierarchies. They are quick, egalitarian to the brink of dysfunction, unsteady, and succeed when held together by a point of reference, which is usually something they are against.

Martin Gurri writes in Revolt of the Public that “Nothing within the bounds of human nature could be less like a hierarchy.”

“Where the latter is slow and plodding, networked action is lightning quick but unsteady in purpose.”
“Where hierarchy has evolved a hard exoskeleton to keep every part in place, the network is loose and pliable—it can swell into millions or dissipate in an instant.”

Gurri says that “Digital networks are egalitarian to the brink of dysfunction. Most would rather fail in an enterprise than acknowledge rank or leaders of any sort.”

“Wael Ghonim’s passionate insistence on being an ordinary Egyptian rather than a political leader was an expression of digital culture.”

Gurri notes that “Networks succeed when held together by a single powerful point of reference—an issue, person, or event —which acts as center of gravity and organizing principle for action.”

“Typically, this has meant being against. If hierarchy worships the established order, the network nurtures a streak of nihilism.”

He adds that “The Obama administration, the grandees of the Democratic Party, and even the Republican establishment—all objects of the Tea Party’s uninvited attention— reacted to the uprising with surprise and disbelief. That has been true of every collision between the public and authority I have documented in this book.”

Another way to characterize the collision of the two worlds is as an episode in the primordial contest between the Center and the Border. The center cannot hold, and the border has no idea what to do, so it attacks.

Gurri says, “The terms were employed by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in another context, long before the advent of the information tsunami, but they are singularly apt for our present condition.”

Gurri adds that, “‘Center’ and ‘Border’ can be applied to organizations embracing specific structures, ideals, and beliefs about the future. The two archetypes are relative to each other, and perform a kind of dance that determines the direction of social action.”

He notes that “The Center, Douglas and Wildavsky write, is dominated by large, hierarchical organizations.”

“It frankly believes in sacrificing the few for the good of the whole. It is smug about its rigid procedures. It is too slow, too blind to new information. It will not believe in new dangers and will often be taken by surprise.”
“The Center envisions the future to be a continuation of the status quo and churns out program after program to protect this vision.”

He continues that “The Border, in contrast, is composed of ‘sects’—we would say ‘networks’— which are voluntary associations of equals.”

“Sects exist to oppose the Center: they stand firmly against.”
“They have, however, ‘no intention of governing,’ and develop ‘no capacity for exercising power.’”
Rank means inequality, hierarchy means conspiracy to the Border. Rather than articulate programs as alternatives to those of the Center, sects aim to model the behaviors demanded from the “godly or good society.”

Gurri says, “Making a program is a center strategy; attacking center programs on behalf of nature, God, or the world is a border strategy.”

“To maintain unity, the sectarian requires ‘an image of threatening evil on a cosmic scale’: the future is always doomsday. The Border somehow reconciles a faith in human perfectibility with the calm certainty that annihilation is just around the corner.”
“Sects resolve internal disputes by splintering. Their numbers must remain small. This may be the one strategic difference between the face-to-face sect, as described by Douglas and Wildavsky, and the digital network: the latter can inflate into millions literally at the speed of light.”

Outsider heroes strike at the forces of monopoly and centralization, while the hierarchy will smash the individual to preserve the system. That means individual outsiders can suffer disproportionate punishment, but the hierarchical systems are at risk of collapse.

Martin Gurri writes that “Viewed from within this scheme, the stories of the last chapter appear in a new light. Hoder, Wael Ghonim, and Shawn Fanning emerged as sectarian heroes of the digital Border, striking at the forces of monopoly and centralization.”

He says that “Ahmadinejad, Mubarak, and Jack Valenti each represented a mighty hierarchy of the traditional Center, slow-turning yet implacable, perfectly willing to smash the individual to preserve the system.”

“Two of the young sectarians, Hoder and Fanning, received disproportionate punishment.”
“The third, Ghonim, spent eleven nights in the dungeons of the Center.”

“But at the end of the day two great hierarchies—the Mubarak regime and the recording industry—had been toppled.”

“The viciousness of the regime matters. It was safer to protest against Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt than against Qaddafi in Libya or Assad in Syria— or, for that matter, the Kim dynasty in North Korea.”

Gurri notes that “Programmatic goals, we have seen, are the business of the Center, and will be rejected by a public that has clung to Border ideals from Lippmann’s day to our own.”

What broke Lippmann’s heart was the assumption that the people of political philosophy must exist in political reality. But the ideal of the “sovereign and omnicompetent citizen” was unattainable; the border lacks positive proposals around which believers could rally and move forward after that negation had been achieved.

Martin Gurri writes in Chapter 4 of Revolt of the Public that “He knew that the public was the only candidate available for the job, and, as an astute observer of events, he felt keenly the disproportion between his hopes and the truth.”

But he adds that “The ideal of the ‘sovereign and omnicompetent citizen’ was unattainable.”

“The public was born of expediency among private citizens who shared an interest—civic or selfish— in an affair, and would be aligned differently, or simply vanish, phantom-like, on other issues.”
“In principle no less than in fact, this mutable entity could not be identified with the people.”

For Gurri, “the claim has proved irresistible to those who wish to challenge an established government or political system. This has been true not just for manipulative institutions like the Egyptian military, but for the public itself.”

“The ‘Occupy’ groups in the US, with tiny numbers on the street compared to Egypt’s protesters, still claimed to represent the ‘99 percent’ against the predations of the elite.”
“In less turbulent times, the Tea Party might have been expected to build on its surprising victory and challenge for control of the government—for example, in the presidential elections of 2012. Just the opposite occurred.”

“Once President Obama’s political agenda had been checkmated, the movement began to lose cohesion and force.”

Gurri notes, “It was a revolt of the sectarian Border, motivated by the negation of the Center, and lacked positive proposals around which believers could rally and move forward after that negation had been achieved.”

2016: Pivoting From the War on Terror to Fighting Populism

But populism is a recent concern. Cas Mudde published The Populist Zeitgeist in 2004, and in all of 2005, it was cited just nine times. Populism was not an important talking point and wouldn’t be until the financial crisis of 2008.

Peter Baker writes in The Guardian that “When The Populist Zeitgeist was published, populism wasn’t a hot topic: in all of 2005, Mudde’s paper was cited only nine times.”

“But as the field of populism studies has ballooned alongside mainstream interest in the subject, the paper has become widely recognized as a classic.”
“By a wide margin, Mudde is now the populism scholar most likely to be cited or interviewed by journalists – as often as not, for articles in which his definition intermingles with the same old sloppy generalizations he set out to overturn.”

Baker notes that “Today, no academic disputes the dominance of Mudde’s definition, especially among the growing number of scholars hoping to be part of the conversation about populism as a global phenomenon.”

Baker says, “One major factor in its success, in fact, is the way that it anticipated events in world politics.”

“The market crashes of 2008 led to the emergence of anti-austerity movements – such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Occupy worldwide – motivated by rage at financial institutions and the small class of people who benefited from their profits.”
“These movements were obviously animated by a sense of opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ – but old theories of populism that defined it specifically as rightwing, racist, or anti-immigrant were insufficiently capacious to describe these new developments in populist politics.”

The rise of the Censorship Industrial Complex is a response by the establishment to the counter-populist reaction. Its origins in America can be traced back to Obama and his signing into law the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act.

Alex Gutentag writes for Public News that “The CTIL Files provided the missing link between the Clinton campaign and the broader Trump delegitimation and censorship strategy. We are gaining an increasingly complete picture of the rise of the Censorship Industrial Complex as a counter-populist reaction by the establishment.”

Gutentag notes that “Jacob Siegler located Obama as the originator, with Clinton, of the Censorship Industrial Complex.”

“In his last days in office, President Barack Obama made the decision to set the country on a new course. On Dec. 23, 2016, he signed into law the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, which used the language of defending the homeland to launch an open-ended, offensive information war,” wrote Siegel.”

“And Siegel noted that Obama was effectively putting in place a counter-populist strategy.”

“Something in the looming specter of Donald Trump and the populist movements of 2016 reawakened sleeping monsters in the West. Disinformation, a half-forgotten relic of the Cold War, was newly spoken of as an urgent, existential threat.”
“The message from the U.S. defense establishment was clear,” noted Siegel, “To win the information war—an existential conflict taking place in the borderless dimensions of cyberspace—the government needed to dispense with outdated legal distinctions between foreign terrorists and American citizens.”

Gutentag continues that “The CTIL Files have provided clear and specific evidence that this plan for an offensive information war, which treated American citizens as hostile foreign adversaries, was indeed implemented, and key organizations involved in censorship were also responsible for promoting the Trump-Russia hoax.”

“This strongly suggests that narrative control strategies like censorship were ultimately part of a larger influence operation to undermine and vilify populism.”

After Trump’s election, the vast apparatus established to combat the War on Terror shifted its focus from terrorism to populism. Americans are now treated as an enemy population, which has the added benefit of helping the intelligence community justify its existence.

Alex Gutentag writes for Public News that “This is clear in the FBI’s attempts to entrap alleged right-wing extremists, target Trump supporters, and retaliate against whistleblowers. These efforts are in part driven by perverse incentives and the fact that the counter-terror bureaucracy needs to manufacture new threats to maintain its budget and justify its existence.”

Gutentage writes, “But there are also clear ideological factors behind the anti-populist turn in both federal law enforcement and the intelligence community.”

“Both now essentially treat Americans as an enemy population, with enormous support from the Democratic party and the legacy media.”

Populism in America

America long seemed exempt from the populist mood, but recent polling suggests that Americans are now average in this regard.

David Brooks writes in the New York Times that in early 2024, “the Ipsos research firm issued a report based on interviews with 20,630 adults in 28 countries, including South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil, and Germany, last November and December. On question after question the American responses were average.”

Brooks notes that “Americans’ pessimism is average.”

“Roughly 59 percent of Americans said they believed their country is in decline, compared to 58 percent of people across all 28 countries who said that.”
“Sixty percent of Americans agreed with the statement ‘the system is broken,’ compared to 61 percent in the worldwide sample who agreed with that.”

He writes, “Americans’ hostility to elites is average.”

“Sixty-nine percent of Americans agreed that the “political and economic elite don’t care about hard-working people,” compared with 67 percent of respondents among all 28 nations.”
“Sixty-three percent of Americans agreed that ‘experts in this country don’t understand the lives of people like me,’ compared with 62 percent of respondents worldwide.”

And finally, Brooks notes that “Americans’ authoritarian tendencies are pretty average.”

“Sixty-six percent of Americans said that the country ‘needs a strong leader to take the country back from the rich and powerful,’ compared with 63 percent of respondents among the 28 nations overall.”
“Forty percent of Americans said they believed we need a strong leader who will ‘break the rules,’ which was only a bit below the 49 percent globally who believed that.”

Instead of acknowledging that voters legitimately elected Trump in 2016, they insisted that he stole the election with the help of Russia.

Michael Shellenberger writes that “The CIA created the basis for the investigation of the Donald Trump campaign by manipulating an Intelligence Assessment of Russia’s preference for the US presidential candidate.”

“The CIA would involve itself in US politics in 2016, when its head, John Brennan, created the basis for the investigation of the Donald Trump campaign by manipulating an Intelligence Assessment of Russia’s preference for the US presidential candidate and having foreign intelligence allies “bump” Trump campaign operatives in order to justify the- FBI’s “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation.”

Mike Benz says today’s demands for censorship around the world are a kind of “blowback” from decades of counterpopulist propaganda efforts waged by US government “deep state” agencies. The deep state pivoted onto disinformation in response to the shock elections of 2016.

Mike Benz told the June 2024 conference that:

“We lost the Philippines election when President Duterte was elected. Then Brexit happened in June. Then the US elections in November. All of these elections were internet elections. That is, the popular press and the U.S.-funded independent media organizations in the territory, for example, were all strongly against what happened. The month after Brexit, in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO formally updated its charter to add hybrid warfare as a capacity to financially build-out.”

“In 2017, said Benz, there was a series of disinformation conferences that “I call the sort of ‘dirty diplomats roadshow’ where exiles of the Hillary Clinton State Department, who all had thought they were getting promotions to the White House National Security Council when Hillary Clinton won the 2016 election, were unceremoniously fired” after Donald Trump became president.”

“The National Endowment for Democracy said Benz, “embarked on a formal quest to get censorship laws passed around the world, which touches on what everybody in this room is concerned about, which is this sort of mysterious homogeneity of all these censorship laws, from Australia to Brazil to Europe with the EU Digital Services Act. They have one thing in common: USAID’s N.E.D. program.”
“As such, what is behind today’s demands for censorship around the world is a kind of ‘blowback’ from decades of counter-populist propaganda efforts waged by US government ‘deep state’ agencies, namely the CIA, abroad.”

Germany used the Russia collusion angle to create a regulatory scheme in Europe around things like [social media regulation] NetzDG.

Shellenberger writes that “Germany used the allegation that Trump had colluded with the Russian government to steal the 2016 election, and was used as an excuse for creating a ‘regulatory scheme in Europe around things like [social media regulation] NetzDG in Germany.’”

Counter-Populist Tactics in the US

The result has been large-scale information warfare against US citizens, with sophisticated tactics being employed to develop propaganda narratives about Trump, Covid, and the 2020 election in the name of combating ‘disinformation.’

Alex Gutentag revealed in December 2023 that “Public has uncovered clear evidence that military contractors appear to have been at the forefront of this effort.”

“On April 27, 2017, Rand Waltzman testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Cybersecurity.”

To fight Russian “misinformation,” Waltzman said, the country would need a “whole-of-nation approach.” The team that went on to create AMITT cited Waltzman’s testimony as their source of inspiration.
Testified Waltzman, “A whole-of-nation approach is a coordinated effort between national government organizations, military, intelligence community, industry, media, research organizations, academia, and citizen organized groups. A discreet US Special Operations Force could provide individual country support as well as cross country coordination.”

Gutentag notes that “Indeed, Terp and former Navy commander Pablo Breuer both worked for Sofwerx, which is financed by the US military Special Operations Command, and they met at a Special Operations Command exercise in 2018.”

It was at this exercise that Terp and Breuer developed their plan to treat misinformation (or viewpoints they disliked) as a “cybersecurity problem.”

Gutentag continues, “Psychological and influence operations have long been used to secure military objectives. We now have clear evidence that with the creation of CTIL and its partnership with CISA, Terp and her colleagues pioneered the use of psychological strategies to combat populism at home by censoring information and narratives associated with populist discontent.”

“What was once considered a ‘conspiracy theory’ that military and intelligence forces were manipulating public opinion through inorganic interventions, has now been confirmed.”

“Public’s study of the Censorship Industrial Complex has exposed a far-reaching plan to subvert the democratic process and engage in activities that have a basis in military techniques and which are tantamount to attempts at thought or mind control.”

Rand Waltzman proposed the creation of a “Center for Cognitive Security” that would be financed by the US government and, to avoid the appearance of too much government influence, through “a combination of private foundation funding and support from international non-partisan non-governmental organizations (e.g., the United Nations).”

Alex Gutentag wrote in December 2023 that “Many organizations within the Censorship Industrial Complex have used this model, accepting both government and private funding to create an illusion of being ‘non-partisan,’ and deliberately forming supposed public-private partnerships to conceal First Amendment violations.”

Gutentag writes, “The ‘Center’ Rand envisioned, he said, would use the offensive strategies of Russian ‘disinformation’ agents for defensive purposes.”

“These strategies would include profiling the population to determine “who in each community is most susceptible to given types of messages,” designing and pushing “a narrative likely to succeed in displacing a narrative unfavorable to you with one that is more favorable,” and using “continual monitoring and interaction to determine the success of your effort and adjust in real-time.”

“Concluded Waltzman,”

“It is said that where there is a will, there is a way. At this point, ways are available. The question is, do we have the will to use them?“

Public News exposed a Misinfosec report, motivated by the two big populist moments of 2016: Trump and Brexit, that advocated for sweeping government censorship.

On the release of the CTIL Files, Public News wrote, “The Misinfosec report advocated for sweeping government censorship and counter-misinformation. During the first six months of 2019, the authors say, they analyzed ‘incidents,’ developed a reporting system, and shared their censorship vision with ‘numerous state, treaty and NGOs’””

“In every incident mentioned, the victims of misinformation were on the political Left, and they included Barack Obama, John Podesta, Hillary Clinton, and Emmanuel Macron.”
“The report was open about the fact that its motivation for counter-misinformation was the twin political earthquakes of 2016: Brexit and the election of Trump.”

“Terp and her co-authors wrote that:”

“A study of the antecedents to these events lead us to the realization that there’s something off kilter with our information landscape. The usual useful idiots and fifth columnists—now augmented by automated bots, cyborgs and human trolls—are busily engineering public opinion, stoking up outrage, sowing doubt and chipping away at trust in our institutions. And now it’s our brains that are being hacked.”

The Public News article writes, “The Misinfosec report focused on information that ‘changes beliefs’ through ‘narratives,’ and recommended a way to counter misinformation by attacking specific links in a ‘kill chain’ or influence chain from the misinfo ‘incident’ before it becomes a full-blown narrative.”

“The report laments that governments and corporate media no longer have full control of information.”

“For a long time, the ability to reach mass audiences belonged to the nation-state (e.g. in the USA via broadcast licensing through ABC, CBS, and NBC).
“Now, however, control of informational instruments has been allowed to devolve to large technology companies who have been blissfully complacent and complicit in facilitating access to the public for information operators at a fraction of what it would have cost them by other means.”

The Public News article notes that “The authors advocated for police, military, and intelligence involvement in censorship, across Five Eyes nations, and even suggested that Interpol should be involved.”

A whistleblower also told Public that a former” British intelligence analyst was “in the room” at the Obama White House in 2017 when she received the instructions to create a counter-disinformation project to stop a "repeat of 2016". Western intelligence agencies and governments have been undermining populist movements for years.

Public News reported on a whistleblower who alleged “that a leader of CTI League, a ‘former’ British intelligence analyst, was ‘in the room’ at the Obama White House in 2017 when she received the instructions to create a counter-disinformation project to stop a ‘repeat of 2016.’

In May 2024, Michael Shellenberger reported that “Current and ‘former’ government officials from the CIA, Defense Department, and FBI all participated in disinformation operations from 2017 to 2020.”

“One disinformation operation, ‘Hamilton68,’ created large quantities of mainstream news coverage in the US that falsely labeled American and British Twitter users as ‘Russian bots.’”
“Another operation involved falsely claiming that Russian bots were supporting a Republican Senate candidate in a special 2017 election.”

Shellenberger continues, “Those various ‘information operations,’ as militaries call them, appear to have been aimed at undermining the populist appeal of Trump and Brexit by defining their supporters as foreigners, not nationalists.”

He adds, “European Union leaders appear to be doing the same. In February, European leaders warned of “Russian disinformation” in the run-up to the EU elections.”

“Reuters reported that the French government had taken ‘multi-faceted actions… to reverse an anti-French narrative that has damaged its influence and interests, including with a unit dedicated in part to spotting and dealing with malicious content.’”
Reported Reuters, “French officials said that so far, the websites in question had made few inroads,” meaning they had had no discernible virality, reach, or influence over voters, just like the TikTok posts in New Caledonia.”

Depicting MAGA Republicans as Extremists

There may have been hundreds of undercover government agents and informants, both local and federal, in the January 6 crowd.

Madeleine Rowley and Alex Gutentag revealed in July 2023 that “A wide range of intelligence and police officers may have been present at the January 6th riot.”

“According to one January 6 witness, there were 100-200 Secret Service agents alone at the Capitol before and during the breach of the police barriers.”
“At least eight confirmed FBI confidential human sources were in the Proud Boys.”
“There were allegedly 20 FBI assets at the Capitol.”
“Another source claims there were “at least forty (40) undercover informants or agents doing surveillance among [Proud Boys] defendants on January 6.”
“Although we don’t know the extent to which FBI informants pushed rioters to enter the Capitol, we do know that at least one undercover Metro Police officer was allegedly shouting, “Stop the Steal!”

They continue, “The Oath Keepers, one of the far-right groups that organized the January 6 rally, had an informant within their highest ranks.”

“A leaked court document suggests the organization’s second-in-command was an FBI informant.”
“This information implies that, at the very least, the FBI had a direct line to one of the groups most heavily involved in the Capitol riot.”

In 2020, the FBI created the scaffolding for a kidnapping plot against Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. This narrative was an apparent attempt to link anti-lockdown sentiment to far-right violent extremism, and mainstream media coverage bolstered this attempt.

“The FBI funded and organized two ‘militia’ conferences in 2020 to lure would-be kidnappers,” writes journalist Julie Kelly.

The FBI then “handled all expenses so indigent defendants could attend surveillance and training excursions, which were photographed by the government to use as evidence.”

Madeleine Rowley and Alex Gutentag wrote for Public News that “The FBI paid multiple informants in cash, including at least $50,000 to the lead informant.”

“Attorneys for the Whitmer kidnapping defendants identified at least a dozen FBI informants from multiple FBI field offices.”
“Informants recorded their targets when they were drunk or stoned, or both.”
“Cherry-picked clips from more than 1,000 hours of taped conversations were used as evidence at trial.”
“So, too, were inflammatory text messages posted in group text messaging chats, which were also created and monitored by the FBI.”

Rowley and Gutentag continue, “The FBI even fabricated a ‘militia group’ so informants could recruit their targets into the organization.”

“The lead informant, in violation of FBI policy, was sworn in as a leader of the imaginary militia to make it look legitimate to the unsuspecting targets of the entrapment operation.”
“In addition to the dozen or so informants, three FBI undercover agents entered the plot when the random ‘kidnapping’ group was on the verge of disbanding in August 2020.”

The authors wrote, Because of this overwhelming evidence of entrapment, jurors acquitted two defendants of all charges.

“The Grand Rapids jury hung on all other charges for two additional defendants, Barry Croft, Jr., and Adam Fox, the alleged ringleader.”
“At the time of the kidnapping plot, Fox lived in the dilapidated cellar of a vacuum repair shop in southwestern Michigan without running water or a toilet.”
“Fox and Croft were convicted in a second trial in August of 2022.”

Rowley and Gutentag say that “Part of the Whitmer kidnapping narrative was that the defendants were motivated by their rage over COVID-19 restrictions.”

“This narrative was an apparent attempt to link anti-lockdown sentiment to far-right violent extremism, and mainstream media coverage bolstered this attempt.”
“The timing of the arrests, which came one month before Election Day in 2020, provided fodder for Whitmer and the Biden campaign to blame Donald Trump for stoking violence against one of his most well-known political foes. Biden talked about the fabricated plot in the waning weeks of the campaign.”

Populism in Brazil

Brazil’s political Left and mainstream news media claimed that Bolsonaro won by spreading “disinformation,” in the same way that progressives in the US and in Britain blamed disinformation for the election of Donald J. Trump and Brexit in 2016.

Michael Shellenberger wrote in August 2024 that “The news media have been demanding more censorship by governments of social media platforms for over a decade, and those demands intensified after the elections of Trump in 2016 and of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018, which the media blamed on “misinformation” and “foreign influence” to delegitimize those candidates.”

“The legacy media also has a direct financial interest in censoring social media. Social media competes for advertising, readers, and legitimacy with legacy news media.”

Nico Audisio wrote in September 2023 for Public News that “In 2018, Brazilians elected a conservative nationalist and populist president named Jair Bolsonaro, a former member of Congress and Brazilian Army captain.”

“Opponents of Bolsonaro said a ‘web of disinformation’ on private group app systems, WhatsApp and Telegram resulted in his election, which he won by 10 points.”

“But since messages are end-to-end encrypted, there is no more good evidence of this than that Russian disinformation elected Trump, a hypothesis that most mainstream political scientists reject.”

“Even so, many in the mainstream media, particularly David Nemer of Harvard and Oxford University’s Caio Machado, claimed, without good evidence, that fake news had resulted in Bolsonaro’s election.”
“And in a striking similarity between Trump and Bolsonaro, fake news became the scapegoat for Bolsonaro’s popularity and the fight against them a Trojan Horse for the creation of a Censorship Industrial Complex that is far more antidemocratic than the allegedly anti-democratic movements it targets.”

Michael Shellenberger writes for Public News that “In October 2022, before the second round of presidential elections, Lula’s lawyer created a report claiming that supporters of Lula’s opponent, Jair Bolsonaro, had created a ‘disinformation ecosystem’”

“This led the TSE to indict and censor 55 prominent individuals, including Bolsonaro, his sons, journalists, and activists. De Moraes even created a special secretive police force, “Núcleo de Inteligência,” to oversee the censorship process.”
“After the 2022 elections,” wrote David Ágape last year, “Moraes met with the president-elect, urging the implementation of social networks regulation legislation.”

Shellenberger wrote in August 2024 that “Another reason Lula and Moraes are attacking X is because free speech undermines their legitimacy.”

“The public is free to criticize them on X in ways that the mainstream news media often does not allow.”
“The Brazilian government directly finances the legacy news media. All media in Brazil, even independent podcasters, fear the government.”
“They fear either being denied taxpayer subsidies or being prosecuted.”

Unlike in the US and Britain, where the executive branch agencies push censorship, Brazil’s Supreme Court uses its extraordinary powers to crack down on the so-called disinformation.

Nico Audisio noted in September 2023 that “It gave Alexandre de Moraes, the only member of the court with experience as a public prosecutor, unprecedented power to censor and punish agents of disinformation.”

Just a few months into Bolsonaro’s presidency, Dias Toffoli, then president of the court, gave the Supreme Court the power to open its own investigations.
In the same single-page decision, he appointed Alexandre de Moraes as the head of the so-called “Fake News” investigation.

Audisio continues, “The Supreme Court was able to abuse its powers because there is no higher power to regulate it.”

“To even open the investigation the court simply cited one of its internal bylaws that allow it to investigate crimes done ‘on its premises’ and then defined the whole of the Internet as inside court premises. Many in Brazil viewed this to be as preposterous as it seems.”
“Those that use ‘fake news’ to incite ‘hatred and intolerance’ towards the ‘political regime and democratic institutions’ are not worthy of ‘constitutional protection’ that ensures freedom of expression,” said one of the justices after the ruling.”

Audisio notes, “Through this investigation, De Moraes, known as ‘Big Alex,’ has the authority to issue judicial decrees ordering social media companies to close specific accounts or face heavy fines for every hour they fail to comply.”

“Through these decrees, De Moraes punishes those that he alone determines to be spreaders of disinformation without due process or transparency.”

The Twitter Files Brazil revealed that Moraes was violating the Brazilian Constitution by demanding the censorship of Twitter users and turning content moderation policies against supporters of Bolsonaro.

The Twitter Files Brazil revealed that:

“Moraes had violated the Brazilian Constitution.”
“Moraes illegally demanded that Twitter reveal private information about Twitter users who used hashtags he considered inappropriate.”
“He demanded access to Twitter's internal data, violating the platform's policy.”
“He censored, on his own initiative and without any respect for due process, posts on Twitter by parliamentarians from the Brazilian Congress.”
“Moraes tried to turn Twitter's content moderation policies into a weapon against supporters of then-president Jair Bolsonaro.”

Twitter refused to comply with Moraes’ demands. Moraes froze Starlink’s accounts, and the Brazilian government blocked X and threatened citizens with an $8,900 fine per day if they circumvent the ban using VPNs.

Michael Shellenberger revealed in the Twitter Files Brazil that “when Twitter refused to provide Brazilian authorities with private user information, including direct messages, the government attempted to sue Twitter's top Brazilian lawyer.”

“It revealed that a government prosecutor said that Google, Facebook, Uber, WhatsApp, and Instagram had all complied. Google even sent Congress many gigabytes of data from deleted videos on YouTube.”

Shellenberger continues, “At 5:52 pm ET on April 6, 2024, X corporation, formerly known as Twitter, announced that a Brazilian court had forced it to ‘block certain popular accounts in Brazil.’”

“Less than one hour later, X's owner, Elon Musk, announced that X would defy the court’s order and lift all restrictions.”
“As a result,” said Musk, “we will probably lose all revenue in Brazil and have to shut down our office there. But principles matter more than profit.”

Shellenberger notes that “the Brazilian government later blocked X, formerly Twitter, and threatened to fine its citizens $8,900 per day if they use it.”

“Brazil, the world's sixth-largest nation by population, joined North Korea, China, and Iran in the list of countries that have banned X.”
Shellenberger noted in August 2024 that everyone “knew that it would be extremely difficult for Moraes to enforce his insane decree, much less fairly and equally. Proof of this comes from the fact that the Brazilian government and the ruling Workers’ Party are still using X, which means they are also using VPNs to evade their own ban.”

Moraes then blocked Starlink’s accounts in Brazil. Starlink released the following statement on X,

“This order is based on an unfounded determination that Starlink should be responsible for the fines levied—unconstitutionally—against X.”

Behind De Moraes are the same NGOs that constitute the Censorship Industrial Complex in the US and Britain. Nico Audisio wrote for Public that the CIC is using Brazil as a model for cracking down on free speech.

Nico Audisio noted for Public that “they include the Atlantic Council, the Poynter Institute, the Oxford Internet Institute, and George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, which held an April 2018 briefing hyping ‘Fake News and Social Media Manipulation.’ These are the same NGOs behind censorship efforts around the world, from the US and Canada to Europe.”

Audisio continues, “The Censorship Industrial Complex, which consists of government agencies, including military, intelligence, and security agencies, working alongside NGO allies and “cut-outs,” is using Brazil as a model for cracking down on free speech and otherwise punishing voices that reject the global economic model as represented by the World Economic Forum, Atlantic Council, and Open Society Foundations.”

Michael Shellenberger added in August 2024 that “Pro-censorship scholars at Stanford and Harvard, Democrats in Congress, and the US news media have long recognized that the First Amendment is an obstacle to their plans.”

“And so they have supported censorship efforts by nations with weaker free speech protections, like Brazil, Britain, Australia, and the European Union, to censor and even block X.”

The US government and George Soros's funding are behind much of the Censorship Industrial Complex in Brazil.

Michael Shellenberger asked in August 2024, “Why did Brazil become a dictatorship? Because it was what was required for Lula’s Workers Party, the legacy news media, and the US government to maintain control.”

He cites the influence of George Soros and his Open Society Foundations, which “donated an astonishing 31.3 million dollars to pro-censorship NGOs in 2023.”

Soros’ foundation has for years been funding “fact checkers,” “journalists,” and “non-governmental organizations,” many of which are also supported by the US government, to whip up national hysteria about “misinformation,” demand more censorship, and justify the abuses of power by Moraes. And the US embassy refused to criticize the Brazilian government this morning.

Shellenberger notes that “A representative of the FBI advised the Brazilian government to censor ‘misinformation’ to prevent ‘foreign interference.’”

Beginning in early 2017, several military and intelligence agencies and agents from the US and UK governments developed similar censorship tactics that Brazil's Superior Electoral Court (TSE) was caught using.

Michael Shellenberger noted that those tactics included:

“Discrediting popular and populist journalists and politicians.”
“The creation of specialized government, or government-funded, spy units to collect evidence on people suspected of spreading misinformation.”
“The use of third-party ‘influencers’ to demand that social networks change their Terms of Service.”
“Pressure on advertisers to boycott social media platforms that allow free speech, which worked on Facebook.”

TSE’s 2022 strategic plan cites several reports from the most influential Censorship Industrial Complex organizations:

Michael Shellenberger notes that these include:

“The Aspen Institute and the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO).”
“SIO receives funding from the National Science Foundation and was created by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to censor disfavored views about Covid-19 and the 2020 election in the US.”

Shellenberger continues, “The TSE’s plan cites Stanford’s Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) final report.”

“As Public has previously reported, EIP advocated for censorship of political views and recommended that platforms censor sitting Congress members.”
“The key strategist behind EIP, SIO’s Renee Diresta, is a former CIA Fellow.”

He adds that “Graphika, a partner in EIP, is also cited in the TSE’s strategic plan.”

“Graphika receives funding from the US Department of Defense (DOD), Navy, Airforce, and the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).”

Shellenberger writes that “The TSE used Brazilian fact-checker's reports as a basis for its censorship directives.”

“These fact-checkers, such as Agência Lupa, Aos Fatos, UOL Confere, and Estadão, were certified by the Poynter Institute.”
“The Poynter Institute receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which, according to the New York Times, was created “to do in the open what the Central Intelligence Agency has done surreptitiously for decades.”

“The Washington Post has also characterized NED as a CIA cut-out.”

Shellenberger says, “In a clear example suggesting that the US government-backed TSE’s actions in Brazil, ‘disinformation experts’ at multiple events held by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) pushed for extensive censorship in Brazil.”

“In 2022, the Foundation for Freedom online reported that ‘disinformation experts’ on a 2019 DFRLab panel claimed that private encrypted messages were a threat to democracy in Brazil.”
“DFRLab is funded by NED, the State Department, and USAID. In line with DFRLab’s views, WhatsApp has banned hundreds of thousands of accounts in Brazil, and in 2022 a federal judge temporarily blocked all access to Telegram.”

Martin Gurri on Brexit

The British vote to leave the European Union was a textbook example of democracy delivering a perplexing outcome—and of the public on a rampage. The vote exposed in the elites a virginal ignorance about their alienation from the public.

Martin Gurri writes in the afterword of his book Revolt of the Public that “The referendum had been called by David Cameron, (the) Conservative prime minister, to fulfill a campaign promise. Cameron himself, however, strongly opposed the exit initiative, as did the Labour and Social Democratic opposition, the respectable news media, the archbishop of Canterbury, and a long line of foreign heads of state starting with Barack Obama.”

“Given the thunderous pro-Europe chorus of establishment voices, the vote against—like the Trump vote in the US—became a matter of because rather than despite.”

Gurri notes that “although opinion polls had shown a tight contest, elites in Britain and Europe were utterly shocked by the outcome of the referendum.”

Keith Vaz, a Labour legislator, said: “This is a crushing decision; this is a terrible day for Britain and a terrible day for Europe. In 1,000 years, I would never have believed that the British people would vote for this.”

Gurri continues that “Such radical disconnection from the public, even more than immigration or terror, helped explain the revolt from below implicit in the Brexit vote.”

“Afterwards, the mass media portrayed pro-Brexit voters regretting their foolish impulse, or asking, in confusion, what the EU actually was.”
“But it was the elites who clung to a virginal ignorance about their alienation from the public: next time, they were certain to be surprised again.”

Multiculturalism has become the official ideology of British institutions, and the Brexit vote was aimed at this position. Critics say this attitude is xenophobic, while others say it’s motivated by a love of country and its civic traditions.

Gurri writes that “As the sharp old class differences have abated, all other differences have been magnified. The official ideology of British institutions is multiculturalism, the glorification of diversity… How much this has contributed to the fragmentation of national identity would be a worthwhile topic of research.”

He continues, “Ethnic and religious minorities remain unreconciled. The Muslim population in particular has produced perpetrators of domestic terror and Islamic State atrocities—recall the grim video images of “Jihadi John,” beheader to the Caliphate, with his thick London accent… The Brexit vote in a sense was aimed at Jihadi John and his kind. Whether this was driven by love of country and its civic traditions or by racism and xenophobia very much depends on where you stand.”

The panic over fake news that followed Trump’s election soon hardened into a theory of universal self-deception. The phrase “post-truth” gained currency after Brexit and Trump clinched the deal.

Gurri writes in Revolt of the Public that “Public opinion, the account went, had become untethered from reality, and democracy was now staggering into a ‘post-truth’ era.”

Gurri says, “This phrase first gained currency after Brexit and always retained a strong British flavor—the Oxford Dictionary made ‘post-truth’ its word of the year for 2016.”

“But it was the US presidential election, and the scandalous rhetoric of Donald Trump, that clinched the deal.”

He notes that “The elite vision of a post-truth era ultimately rests on a fallacy. It assumes that there was once a time when voters acted on some sort of rational calculus based on ‘objective facts,’ and were immune to ‘appeals to emotion and personal belief.’ Consider Matthew d’Ancona’s condemnation of the tactics used by Brexit advocates:”

“This was Post-Truth politics at its purest—the triumph of the visceral over the rational, the deceptively simple over the honestly complex.”

But Gurri writes, “that has always been the way. All the cunning dictators, like Hitler and Mussolini, were persuaded by appealing to raw emotions—but so did the great democrats from Pericles to Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. It’s how human persuasion works.”

The fate of Europe, like that of Britain, is slipping from the grasp of a purblind political class. The higher meaning of Brexit may be an indicator of a great secular reversal, where institutions have entered a moment of disintegration.

Gurri writes, “Globally, institutions have entered a moment of decadence and disintegration—and the EU has been singularly afflicted. Like the old Holy Roman Empire, it lacks a true center and a shared reason for being.”

“Nationalists and separatists, anarchists and populists, all tear at bonds held together mostly by inertia.

“The question, ‘On what principle must we stay?’ receives at best a muddled answer. Democracy now favors the public, and the public, at every level of social and political life, seems to want out.

The UK’s Censorship Efforts During Covid-19

The UK Parliament held a session to combat misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic on social networking and Internet media platforms.

On 18 January 2021, the UK Parliament, in the presence of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, held a session to combat misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic on social networking and Internet media platforms.

The session had a panel of behavioral science experts and another of media representatives of major organizations, including Facebook, Sky News, and Reuters.

The UK government announced in March 2020 that it was cracking down on misinformation about the coronavirus pandemic. A rapid response unit within the Cabinet Office was working with social media firms to remove harmful content.

The BBC reported that “A rapid response unit within the Cabinet Office (was) working with social media firms to remove fake news and harmful content.

“Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden said action was needed "to stem the spread of falsehoods and rumors, which could cost lives.”
“The specialist unit is dealing with as many as 10 incidents each day.”

The UK’s Health Secretary discussed how they needed to “get heavy with the police” to crack down on the public during the pandemic and said the government should use a new variant to “frighten the pants off everyone.”

The Telegraph reported in March 2023 that “Ministers and the country’s most senior civil servant discussed how they needed to ‘get heavy with the police’ to crack down on the public during the Covid pandemic.”

The Telegraph revealed that “WhatsApp messages in The Lockdown Files disclose how Matt Hancock and colleagues gave officers their ‘marching orders’ to enforce lockdown measures.”

The paper noted that “Despite ministers claiming in public that the police are operationally independent of the Government, the leaked messages reveal that senior officers were hauled into Number 10 to be told they should be stricter with the public.”

The Telegraph continued, “Throughout the pandemic, officials and ministers wrestled with how to ensure the public complied with ever-changing lockdown restrictions. One weapon in their arsenal was fear.”

“We frighten the pants off everyone,” Matt Hancock suggested during one WhatsApp message with his media adviser.”

The paper added, “The then-health secretary was not alone in his desire to scare the public into compliance. The WhatsApp messages seen by The Telegraph show how several members of Mr. Hancock’s team engaged in a kind of “Project Fear”, in which they spoke of how to utilize “fear and guilt” to make people obey the lockdown.”

Rishi Sunak, then Chancellor of the UK, discovered that no work had been done by the government on the tradeoffs of lockdown. When he raised these concerns, he was told to stick to the script and discouraged from making any formal inquiries into post-lockdown damage.

The Telegraph reported that “As Chancellor, Sunak assumed that teams were calculating the trade-offs and focusing on those hit by the side effects of lockdown… After learning that this work had not been done, Sunak urged Boris Johnson to level with the public about the likely consequences of the lockdowns; to say there would be bad, as well as good”.

“I was like: ‘You need to go into it knowing that that is what might happen. You've got to prepare the country for it, make sure that everyone is on board. And if you're not, don't run away from it!”

The Telegraph continues, “Not only that but Sunak was told to stick to the official script (‘I wasn't allowed to talk about the trade-off’, he said), and discouraged from making any formal inquiries, even inside the government, into the likely post-lockdown damage.” Sunak said,

“Under lockdown, no one is incentivized to be the person who is optimizing for something other than saving people's lives in the short term.”

In the UK, Prime Minister Boris Johnson considered lifting some of the first lockdown restrictions early but decided against it because it was “too far ahead of public opinion”, while his advisers deployed election strategists to show that lockdown measures were popular with the public.

The Telegraph revealed, as part of its Lockdown Files, that “The then-prime minister had also considered lifting some lockdown restrictions earlier than previously planned in June 2020, but decided against it after being told by his media advisers that doing so would be ‘too far ahead of public opinion’.”

The Telegraph continues, “Meanwhile, Dominic Cummings deployed a Conservative election strategist to reassure hawkish Cabinet ministers that lockdown measures were popular with the public, leaked messages reveal.”

“WhatsApp messages between Matt Hancock, then the health secretary, and Mr Cummings, Boris Johnson’s chief adviser, show they set up a meeting between Cabinet ministers and Isaac Levido in April 2020.”

Dominic Cummings, close adviser to the then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, lamented that the UK had not locked down sooner and harder.

Dominic Cummings (who was then U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s close adviser) lamented that his preferred strategy of sharp and early lockdowns was not implemented early enough in March 2020 and then in September 2020.

The UK government launched a scaremongering advertisement campaign to shame those who didn’t follow lockdown rules.

The campaign's launch occurred a few weeks after England had entered a third period of national lockdown in an attempt to control an ongoing increase in the number of daily cases of the virus, and deaths linked to it.

The adverts first appeared on television on 22 January 2021, airing during commercial breaks on ITV and Channel 4.
The campaign was subsequently rolled out to other media, including radio and social media platforms, the following day.

The Telegraph reported in January 2022 that “The Government’s ‘grossly unethical’ uses of its ‘nudge’ tactics inflated fear among the public during the Covid pandemic, psychologists have said - prompting MPs to launch an investigation into scare adverts.”

“A group of psychologists have written to Parliament’s Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, warning that civil servants and Government scientists used frightening imagery to change public behavior during the pandemic, in a way they say was unaccountable and unethical.”
“Mr Sidley and the letter's other signatories blamed the involvement of the so-called "nudge unit" - or Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) - for the tactics.”

Britain has been drilled to comply with lockdown under a future pandemic, says the chief executive of the UK’s ‘nudge unit’. He said, “There are times when you do need [fear] to cut through… particularly if you think people are wrongly calibrated.”

“Professor David Halpern told the paper that the country had “practiced the drill” of wearing face masks and working from home and “could redo it” in a future crisis.”

The Telegraph continues, “the government adviser Prof Halpern predicted that the country would comply with another ‘stay at home’ order because they ‘kind of know what the drill is’.

The paper noted that “The leading behavioral scientist even suggested that the nation’s prior experience made it ‘much easier to now imagine’ the population would accept future local restrictions.”

“There are times when you do need [fear] to cut through… particularly if you think people are wrongly calibrated.”

But the co-founder of the UK’s Nudge Unit expressed regret at the fear-mongering that took place during the pandemic. “We inadvertently sanctioned state propaganda.”

Laura Dodsworth writes that “Nudge Unit co-founder Simon Ruda penned a mea culpa in 2022. ‘In my mind, the most egregious and far-reaching mistake made in responding to the pandemic has been the level of fear willingly conveyed to the public’, he wrote.”

“Nudging made subtle state influence palatable, but mixed with a state of emergency, have we inadvertently sanctioned state propaganda?”

Dodsworth continues, “Even at the height of the pandemic, some scientists were worried about the government’s fear-mongering.”

“In January 2021, NHS clinical psychologist Dr Gary Sidley and several colleagues wrote to the British Psychological Society (BPS) about the unethical use of strategies to gain mass compliance, including fear, scapegoating, and covert nudging.”
“They claimed that these methods contradict the BPS’s statement of values.”

Dodsworth notes, “Yet many government advisers seemed too wedded to fearmongering to let it go. As Ruda put it, ‘fear seems to have subsequently driven policy decisions’.”

The UK Covid inquiry is limiting outside voices on whether the lockdown was too draconian and is forcing attendees to take lateral flow tests. Almost no one is questioning the establishment view on lockdowns and vaccines, and the inquiry criticized Brexit in its opening, but did not mention the Chinese Communist Party.

“Matthew Lesh, the director of public policy at the IEA, said:”

“The fundamental question at the heart of the Covid-19 inquiry should be whether or not it was appropriate to take such extreme, unprecedented and totalitarian lockdown measures.”
“Yet from the ‘core participants’ to the first set of witnesses, almost nobody is questioning the cozy establishment view.”
“The inquiry appears designed to limit outside voices, self-selecting who can give so-called ‘expert’ evidence and demonstrating no clear way to submit contrarian research.”

The Telegraph cites Prof Steve H Hanke, of Johns Hopkins University, who added:

“A serious inquiry would address why senior officials repeatedly made policy based on fantasy numbers produced by defective epidemiological models, like… Imperial College London’s.

The Telegraph continues that “Pro-lockdown scientists were invited in their droves to appear before the inquiry, while dissenting voices have been almost totally excluded:”

“Prof Karol Sikora and Dr Tom Jefferson, who have also raised concerns about the accuracy of government models, said they have been snubbed by the inquiry.”
“Meanwhile, Baroness Hallett, the inquiry’s chairman, has written to 17 members of Independent Sage, which criticized the country’s reopening and later called for fresh lockdowns, requesting evidence.”

The Telegraph notes that “On its opening day, counsel for the inquiry said preparations for Brexit had ‘crowded out’ the work that was needed to improve pandemic preparedness, leading to allegations of bias from ministers… The Covid-19 inquiry is even demanding that attendees test for the virus more than a year after the Government scrapped lateral flow tests. Those who test positive have been asked to stay away.”

When Prime Minister Rishi Sunak was called before the Covid Inquiry, he highlighted a study that suggested more quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) would be lost by the first lockdown than the virus itself. The inquiry immediately shut him down.

The Telegraph reported that “Rishi Sunak highlighted a study that suggested more quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) would be taken by the first lockdown than the virus itself. This was a significant admission and one that we might have assumed KC Hugo Keith would want to explore further.”

The paper continues, “Instead, he shut the Prime Minister down with unerring speed, stating that he was not interested in this approach – inaccurately labeling them as ‘quality life assurance models’.”

“It was an astonishing sight. Here we have the most powerful person in the country, rightly raising the possibility that the cure was more harmful than the disease.”

Karol Sikora wrote that “This sham inquiry is achieving nothing apart from protecting reputations and lining lawyers' pockets.”

“Sunak’s intervention should be the basis for an entirely new inquiry, one which explores a proper cost-benefit analysis of those two dreadful years. I think we all know what conclusion it would come to.”

Likewise, when Michael Gove told the UK Covid inquiry that the virus may have leaked from a lab, he was immediately shut down and warned that the “divisive” issue was not part of the inquiry’s remit.

The Telegraph reported that “The Levelling-Up Secretary, who was Cabinet Office minister and chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster when the pandemic began in 2020, said dealing with such a ‘novel’ virus presented ‘new challenges’ that required new science. He said:”

“We were not well prepared as we should have been ideally.
“[There is] a significant body of judgment that believes that the virus itself was man-made and that presents sort of challenges as well.”

The paper noted, “Hugo Keith KC, lead counsel to the inquiry, warned Mr Gove that the issue was ‘somewhat divisive’ and not part of the inquiry’s terms of reference.”

The UK’s Monitoring of Its Citizens During the Covid-19 Pandemic

The Cyber Threat Intelligence League (CTIL), an “anti-disinformation” group composed of UK and US contractors, tracks and reports disfavoured content on social media. This includes reporting on anti-lockdown narratives, censorship, and engaging in offensive operations to influence public opinion.

Michael Shellenberger, Alex Gutentag, and Matt Taibi wrote for Public News that “The CTIL officially began as the volunteer project of data scientists and defense and intelligence veterans, but its tactics over time appear to have been absorbed into multiple official projects, including those of the Department of Homeland Security.”

‘Censorship activities overseas are "typically" done by "the CIA and NSA and the Department of Defense," censorship efforts "against Americans" have to be done using private partners because the government doesn't have the "legal authority.’

They continue, “In the spring of 2020, CTIL began tracking and reporting disfavored content on social media, such as anti-lockdown narratives like ‘all jobs are essential,’ ‘we won’t stay home,’ and ‘open America now.’

“CTIL created a law enforcement channel for reporting content as part of these efforts.”
“The organization also researched individuals posting anti-lockdown hashtags like #freeCA and kept a spreadsheet with details from their Twitter bios. The group also discussed requesting “takedowns” and reporting website domains to registrars.”

Shellenberger, Gutentag, and Taibi noted that “They tracked posters calling for anti-lockdown protests as disinformation artifacts. They wrote about the protests:”

“We should have seen this one coming… Bottom line: can we stop the spread, do we have enough evidence to stop superspreaders, and are there other things we can do (are there counter messages we can ping, etc).”

They add, “CTIL’s approach to ‘disinformation’ went far beyond censorship.”

“Leaked documents show that the group engaged in offensive operations to influence public opinion, discussing ways to promote ‘counter-messaging,’ co-opt hashtags, dilute disfavored messaging, create sock puppet accounts, and infiltrate private invite-only groups.”

A shadowy Army unit secretly spied on British citizens who criticized the Government's Covid lockdown policies. It scoured social media for information, which was then used to orchestrate a government response to criticisms of policy, which was then used to pressure social media firms.

Glen Owen writes for the Daily Mail that “Military operatives in the UK's 'information warfare' brigade were part of a sinister operation that targeted politicians and high-profile journalists who raised doubts about the official pandemic response.”

“They compiled dossiers on public figures such as ex-Minister David Davis, who questioned the modeling behind alarming death toll predictions, as well as journalists such as Peter Hitchens and Toby Young. Their dissenting views were then reported back to No 10.”

Owen continues, “Documents obtained by the civil liberties group Big Brother Watch, and shared exclusively with this newspaper, exposed the work of Government cells such as the Counter Disinformation Unit, based in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and the Rapid Response Unit in the Cabinet Office.”

But Owen notes that “the most secretive is the MoD's 77th Brigade, which deploys 'non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to adapt behaviors of adversaries'. According to a whistleblower who worked for the brigade during the lockdowns, the unit strayed far beyond its remit of targeting foreign powers.”

“Papers show the outfits were tasked with countering 'disinformation' and 'harmful narratives... from purported experts', with civil servants and artificial intelligence deployed to 'scrape' social media for keywords such as 'ventilators' that would have been of interest.”
“The information was then used to orchestrate Government responses to criticisms of policies such as the stay-at-home order when police were given the power to issue fines and break up gatherings.”
“It also allowed Ministers to push social media platforms to remove posts and promote Government-approved lines.”

The UK government set up the Counter-Disinformation Unit (CDU) to tackle supposed domestic “threats” and was used to target those critical of lockdown and vaccine policies. It was in ‘hourly” contact with social media companies during the pandemic over critical comments.

The Telegraph reports that “A secretive government unit worked with social media companies in an attempt to curtail discussion of controversial lockdown policies during the pandemic. It was in ‘hourly contact’ with social media companies during the pandemic over critical comments.”

“Critics of lockdown had posts removed from social media.”
“There is growing suspicion that social media firms used technology to stop the posts from being promoted, circulated, or widely shared after being flagged by the CDU [“Countering Disinformation Union”] or its counterpart in the Cabinet Office.”
“The company has been paid more than £1.2 million by the DCMS since January 2021 for work that included helping to “build a comprehensive picture of potentially harmful misinformation and disinformation.”

The Telegraph continues, “The Counter-Disinformation Unit (CDU) was set up by ministers to tackle supposed domestic ‘threats’, and was used to target those critical of lockdown and questioning the mass vaccination of children. The activities of the following people were monitored by government disinformation units”:

“Prof Carl Heneghan, the Oxford epidemiologist who has advised Boris Johnson.”
“Dr Alexandre de Figueiredo, a research fellow at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM).”
“Molly Kingsley, who set up a campaign to keep schools open during the pandemic, also had her social activity monitored.”

The Telegraph notes that “The CDU has also commissioned reports from an external artificial intelligence firm, Logically, which uses AI to trawl the internet and social media sites.”

“The company has been paid more than £1.2 million by the DCMS since January 2021 for work that included helping to “build a comprehensive picture of potentially harmful misinformation and disinformation”.
“The company flagged discussions opposing vaccine passports.”
“In one of the firm’s reports for the CDU, a post by Dr De Figueiredo, the LSHTM researcher who also works for the Vaccine Confidence Project, was flagged. He wrote:”

“People who think we should be mass vaccinating children against Covid-19 poorly understand at least one of the following: (a) risk, especially absolute risk (b) ethics (c) natural immunity (d) vaccine confidence (e) long Covid.”

Targeted posts included:

“A piece by Ms Kingsley was published in February 2022, arguing that it was ‘indefensible’ that children’s lives were still not back to normal when the rest of society was. She urged ministers to make a clear statement that children’s extracurricular activities should not be subject to additional curbs.”
“One of Ms. Kingsley’s tweets from December 2020, in which she said it would be ‘unforgivable to close schools’, was also passed to the CDU.”

The Telegraph writes, “Much of the Government’s wider work on disinformation is shrouded in secrecy for ‘national security’ reasons. Large parts of official documents are still redacted.”

“But many of the issues being raised were valid at the time and have since been proven to be well-founded.”

The government often chaired CDU meetings, and the BBC was present. The corporation sent Jessica Cecil, founder of the Trusted News Initiative, to “observe” the group, whose existence was kept secret.

The Telegraph reported in June 2023 that “They were chaired on some occasions by Dame Caroline Dinenage, the then minister of state for digital and culture, and otherwise by Sarah Connolly, director of security and online harms at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.”

The Telegraph continues, “Attendees included other officials from the DCMS; an official from the Department of Health and Social Care; representatives of social media firms; academics from six universities and someone from the broadcast regulator Ofcom.”

The paper noted, “The BBC took part in secretive meetings of a government policy forum to address the so-called disinformation.”

“The BBC has claimed it only attended the meetings as an “observer”, and has played down its significance, but it inevitably leaves the corporation open to accusations that it was taking dictation from the Government, rather than allowing its journalists to scrutinize all of the evidence independently and impartially.”
“The person sent by the BBC to attend meetings of the Counter-Disinformation Policy Forum was Jessica Cecil, founder of the Trusted News Initiative, which was set up under the then director-general Tony Hall in 2019 – before Covid – to smoke out fake news and warn media partners of untruths circling the globe.”

The Telegraph adds, “Its very existence – along with that of the separate Counter-Disinformation Unit within the Government, exposed by The Telegraph last week – was kept under the radar at the time, and it is not difficult to guess why.”

In addition to the CDU, the UK government operated a Rapid Response Unit (RRU) within the Cabinet Office that searched online for content that was considered disinformation. Social media companies fast-tracked content removal requests flagged by the CDU.

Tony Diver and the Telegraph Investigations team note that “The CDU, which is still operating, was embedded in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).”

The Telegraph adds, “The department has ‘trusted flagger’ status at social media companies including Facebook and Twitter, which means that requests for content to be removed are fast-tracked for consideration… The RRU also logged articles by Prof Heneghan published in The Telegraph and The Spectator.”

“One of these questioned the science behind the rule of six – later abandoned by the Government – and discredited the data used by the Government to justify the second lockdown.”
“He had social media posts about face masks and the accuracy of coronavirus death data removed after the technology giants raised concerns about Covid disinformation.”

The UK government also ran a Counter-Disinformation Policy Forum, which brought together the government, the BBC, and the social media giants to limit the spread of COVID-19 disinformation.

The Telegraph wrote in June 2023 that “The Government also ran a Counter-Disinformation Policy Forum, which brought together civil servants from the DCMS and technology giants - including Facebook and Google - as well as the BBC to discuss how to limit the spread of what was considered COVID-19 disinformation.”

The paper notes, “This forum and the two units were not the only way the Government tried to apply pressure on social media companies during the pandemic.”

The UK was considering making protests exempt from restrictions, but ministers quickly killed the idea.

Brendan O’Neill wrote in December 2022 that “Anti-lockdown protests were quickly banned in 2020… In September of that year, the Cabinet Office suggested protests should be exempt from the ‘rule of six’, which forbade any outside gathering of more than six people, but Hancock called in Michael Gove to ‘kill it off’. And ‘Gove had no qualms about helping’.”

Martin Gurri’s Ideas About What’s Coming

Ideally, our hierarchical structures would give way to a network structure, but this won’t happen because hierarchy is too stubborn.

Martin Gurri starts in Chapter 9 of Revolt of the Public by saying:

“In the best of all possible circumstances, government will assume the shape that dominates the imagination of a historical period.”
“Modern government, a creature of the industrial age, would give way to networked government, able to exploit ‘small world’ links to reduce, formally, the distance between power and the public.”
“Political issues—proposed legislation, for example—would be debated and resolved on a much vaster virtual stage, on which ordinary people, no less than elected or bureaucratic elites, have their say. The output of government would be crowdsourced and thus sanity-checked.”

But Gurri says, “This won’t happen. Hierarchy is too stubborn a structure.”

“The self-interest of the top and the disinterest in wielding the power of the sectarian bottom makes it almost certain that the current structures will endure.”
“The pyramid is losing height, but it almost certainly won’t flatten altogether.”
“Barring some unforeseen and unprecedented breakthrough, the organization of government, like that of corporations, will remain top-down.”

What we’re experiencing isn’t a revolution like in 1789 or 1917; it’s more like 1648 because neither side can wipe out the other. Institutions are drained of trust and legitimacy, but survive in a zombie-like state.

Gurri says in Chapter 10, “My thesis, again, is a simple one. The information technologies of the twenty-first century have enabled the public, composed of amateurs, people from nowhere, to break the power of the political hierarchies of the industrial age.”

“The result hasn’t been a complete revolution in the manner of 1789 and 1917, or utter collapse as in 1991, but more like the prolonged period of instability that preceded the settlement of Westphalia in 1648.”
“Neither side can wipe out the other. A resolution, when it comes, may well defy the terms of the struggle. None is remotely visible as I write these lines.”

Gurri says that “If my thesis is true, we have entered a historical period of revolutionary change that cannot achieve consummation. Institutions are drained of trust and legitimacy, but survive in a zombie-like state.”

“Governments get toppled or voted out, but are replaced by their mirror images.”
“Hierarchies are brought low, but refuse to yield the illusion of top-down control.”

For Gurri, “Hence the worship of the heroic past, the psychology of decadence—the sense, so remarkable in a time of radical impermanence, that there’s nothing new under the sun.”

Change is sudden and dramatic; events don’t proceed in a stately procession, and social and political arrangements tend to accumulate noise. The internal and external forces holding them together inevitably shift in ways that drive the system ever farther out from equilibrium. Such pressures work silently and invisibly, beneath the surface.

Gurri notes in Chapter 5, “A word on method. Many historians have scoffed at the idea that any year, or any cluster of years, could comprise a meaningful causal unit.”

“I was taught at school that everything flows: the Italian Renaissance, with its love of the classical form, represented a moment in a series of classical rebirths going back to Charlemagne and forward to Franklin Roosevelt’s Lincoln Memorial.”
“History, I was assured, advances in a stately procession, not in leaps and bounds.”

But, he says, “When it comes to the behavior of complex systems, I now believe this is flat wrong. Let me explain why.”

“Social and political arrangements tend to accumulate noise. The internal and external forces holding them together inevitably shift in ways that drive the system ever farther out from equilibrium.”
“Such pressures work silently and invisibly, beneath the surface. They are cumulative, slow to take effect.”
“But when change comes, it is sudden and dramatic. Pushed beyond disequilibrium to turbulence, the system disintegrates and must be reconstituted on a different basis.”

So for Gurri, “Thus water is just water interacting with falling temperatures, until abruptly it becomes ice.”

“The Soviet Union was an evil empire and a superpower until suddenly it was neither. Hosni Mubarak was an immovable pharaonic figure, then in two weeks he was gone.”

We’re not at the end of history, as Fukuyama famously said, but he was right that we’ve reached a point since the collapse of the Soviet Union where there are no viable alternatives to Western democracy.

Gurri writes in Chapter 10 that “Following the horrors of 9/11, Fukuyama and his ideas were derided as triumphalist nonsense. But he was only half wrong.”

“Fukuyama, a Hegelian, argued that Western democracy had run out of ‘contradictions’: that is, of ideological alternatives.”
“That was true in 1989 and remains true today.”
“Fukuyama’s mistake was to imply that the absence of contradictions meant the end of history. There was another possibility he failed to consider.”

Once the external pressure applied by communism was removed, democratic countries lost their internal cohesion and began the slow descent into negation. Then the Fifth Wave swept over the political landscape, which bled the legitimacy of many democratic institutions.

Instead, according to Gurri, “The failures of high modernism became painfully evident, when detached from the epic canvas of a life-and-death struggle.”

“The industrial mode of organization, with its militaristic respect for rank, had placed democratic government at a great distance from the governed.”
“Lacking a shared enemy and the urgency of a war footing, public and authority discovered they stood on the opposite sides of many questions.”

Gurri writes, “Then the Fifth Wave swept over the political landscape, giving voice and image and persuasive power to the insistent negations of the public.”

“The result, if my analysis has any validity, has been the bleeding out of legitimacy and living death of many democratic institutions.”

Lily Markle